Is Artificial intelligence a technological revolution, an economic opportunity or a threat to employment? It is all these things. However, for India, its deepest significance rests in that AI is becoming an organising principle of international power.
Artificial intelligence is therefore the ground zero on which the future distribution of global power may be decided. The countries that dominate advanced computing, semiconductor design, data infrastructure, frontier models and the scientific talent behind them will possess advantages extending far beyond the technology sector. They will influence military capability, industrial competitiveness, intelligence, finance, diplomacy and the rules under which the rest of the world accesses knowledge.
We are aware that previous technological transformations saw seismic change through machinery, weapons and industrial production. AI operates differently. It is a general-purpose capability embedded across economic and strategic life. Its hydra-headed qualities can accelerate scientific discovery, improve manufacturing, reshape education, strengthen surveillance, generate propaganda, identify military targets and compress the time available for decisions in a crisis. The same underlying technology can serve both civilian development and warfare.
This makes AI a complicated issue to govern. Nuclear facilities, missile deployments and conventional weapons leave identifiable physical signatures. Advanced algorithms and model weights can be copied, modified and transferred with relative ease. Civilian and military uses cannot always be separated. Traditional approaches to arms control and technology regulation may consequently prove inadequate.
The geopolitical question of who invents the most capable system is not the sole issue here. It is who commands the infrastructure beneath it.
The anatomy of AI power
Sometimes, artificial intelligence is imagined as software floating freely in the digital world. It rests upon a highly concentrated physical architecture: advanced semiconductors, manufacturing equipment, cloud platforms, data centres, electricity grids, cooling systems, undersea cables, critical minerals and specialised human talent.
Several strategic chokepoints are thus created by this architecture. The United States remains pre-eminent in frontier-model development, advanced chip design, cloud infrastructure, research universities and venture finance. Taiwan is indispensable to the manufacture of leading-edge semiconductors. The Netherlands and Japan occupy critical positions in semiconductor equipment. China combines industrial scale, state-directed investment, a large research ecosystem and growing capabilities across chips, models and applications.
A key determinant of technological power today is energy. The International Energy Agency observes that there is “no AI without energy”: Data centres that are AI-focused consume very large quantities of electricity, while the largest facilities under construction may use many times the power of a typical one. Countries able to supply reliable electricity quickly and at scale will possess a significant advantage.
The dependencies thus created turn AI supply chains into instruments of statecraft. Semiconductor export controls, restrictions on manufacturing equipment and rules governing access to advanced computing are now components of geopolitical competition. The United States has explicitly used export controls to regulate the international diffusion of advanced chips and certain powerful closed-model capabilities on national-security grounds.
For India, the first strategic reality of the AI age is this: technological interdependence is unavoidable, but excessive dependence can become a political vulnerability.
The danger of a new technological hierarchy
Will AI produce an international hierarchy resembling the discriminatory structure of the nuclear order? A small number of technological powers might preserve their lead through control over computing infrastructure and access to frontier capabilities, leaving developing countries dependent on systems whose terms they do not determine. But the analogy is not exact. AI is more commercially diffuse than nuclear technology, and open-source models make technological containment difficult. But the political danger cannot be taken lightly.
An AI order dominated by two centres of power would offer the rest of the world a very restrictive and confining choice. Countries might be asked to adopt an American or Chinese technological ecosystem, with each carrying its own hardware, cloud infrastructure, standards, cybersecurity arrangements and political assumptions. Technological choice could increasingly resemble strategic alignment.
The American system is driven principally by private corporations, frontier research and proprietary platforms, though the state exercises growing influence through defence procurement, investment rules and export controls. China’s approach combines state direction with industrial deployment, extensive public infrastructure and a strong commitment to open-source models as instruments of rapid adoption and international reach.
By no means is either model politically neutral. Technology is weighted by the assumptions of the institutions that build and govern it. Dependence on a foreign AI ecosystem can influence where data are stored, whose security standards apply, what forms of surveillance are possible and whether access can be restricted during a diplomatic dispute.
India should therefore resist the idea that the AI world can be carved neatly into American and Chinese spheres. But resistance cannot consist merely of invoking strategic autonomy. India needs sufficient capability and international leverage to keep meaningful choices open that contribute to both national security and national development.
India’s emerging position
India possesses important advantages. It has scale, a large technology workforce, a strong entrepreneurial sector, extensive digital public infrastructure and an international position that enables cooperation with both advanced and developing economies.
The India AI Mission represents an attempt to convert some of these assets into national capability. Its seven pillars include shared computing access, datasets, indigenous models, socially useful applications, skills, start-up financing and safe and trusted AI. The mission has a budgetary outlay of ₹10,372 crore, and its compute programme offers eligible users subsidised access to a diversified pool of advanced processors.
At the 2026 India AI Impact Summit, the government said that more than 38,000 GPUs had already been provisioned under the mission, with plans to add another 20,000. The summit’s declaration, endorsed by 92 countries and international organisations, placed particular emphasis on democratising AI resources, human-capital development, trustworthy systems and access for social empowerment.
These are significant measures. Yet compute rented through public-private partnerships does not by itself constitute technological sovereignty. Much of India’s advanced computing still depends on foreign-designed chips, foreign cloud infrastructure and globally concentrated supply chains. India is building semiconductor capacity, but achieving leadership at the most advanced nodes will require sustained investment, manufacturing experience, research depth and reliable access to specialised equipment.
India should avoid two illusions. One is that self-reliance requires complete technological autarky. That is impossible in an industry whose supply chains cross several continents. The other is that access to global markets makes domestic capability unnecessary. That is a strategic labyrinth that would invite grave complications.
The more realistic objective is managed interdependence: strong indigenous competence in critical areas, diversified supply chains, trusted international partnerships and enough domestic knowledge to evaluate, adapt and, when necessary, replace imported systems.
The India-US relationship
The United States will remain central to India’s AI strategy. Its corporations dominate many layers of the global technology stack, and its universities and research institutions remain vital sources of innovation and talent.
The India-US AI Opportunity Partnership announced in February 2026 explicitly identifies critical minerals, energy, computing and semiconductor manufacturing as the physical foundations of AI. It envisages cooperation in processor access, data centres, research and development, investment and trusted semiconductor ecosystems.
This partnership offers India significant advantages. It can widen access to capital, advanced chips, research networks and frontier technologies. It also fits the larger strategic convergence between India and the United States in response to China’s rise.
But the relationship will involve asymmetry. Washington’s export-control system distinguishes among partners according to security assessments and political trust. Access to advanced technology may remain conditional, revisable and vulnerable to changes in American domestic politics. US companies may invest in Indian capacity while retaining control over the most valuable intellectual property, cloud architecture and model development.
India should deepen the partnership without mistaking strategic convergence for guarantees of technological assurance. Trust is valuable, but capability remains the more durable foundation of ever-resilient autonomy.
China: competitor, neighbour and unavoidable interlocutor
China presents India with a more complicated challenge.
It is a strategic competitor and a military adversary along an unsettled border. At the same time, it is a major economic power, a dominant manufacturing centre and an increasingly capable AI nation. Its advances in affordable and open-source models may prove especially attractive to developing countries that cannot afford proprietary Western systems.
China’s strategy is not simply to produce the world’s most advanced model. It seeks to embed AI across manufacturing, logistics, robotics, surveillance, scientific research and state administration. This integration between digital intelligence and industrial capacity may become a more important benchmark of national power than spectacular performance in isolated frontier areas.
India must study this model without imitating its political features. The lesson is not that India should adopt China’s system of state control. It is that AI policy cannot be separated from industrial policy, education, energy, manufacturing and research.
A country that develops software but imports the hardware, machines, sensors and industrial systems through which AI reaches the physical economy cannot be master of what it surveys.
India should compete with China where necessary and reduce strategic dependence in sensitive sectors. Yet complete technological disengagement would be neither feasible nor wise. India and China will need channels of discussion on AI safety, military applications, cyber instability and international standards. Rival powers have often needed rules precisely because they were rivals.
Beyond the binary
India’s most promising strategy lies in a wider network of technological partnerships.
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are critical to semiconductor and electronics supply chains. Europe offers scientific capability and a regulatory philosophy centred on risk, accountability and fundamental rights. The European Union’s AI Act uses a graduated, risk-based framework, imposing stronger obligations on high-risk systems and powerful general-purpose models.
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries can be valuable partners in research, manufacturing, energy-efficient computing and governance. Singapore offers regulatory and technological sophistication. The Gulf states bring capital, energy and ambitions to become major centres of computing infrastructure.
India should not approach these relationships as supplements to an overwhelmingly American strategy. Together, they can form the basis of a well-calibrated, omnidirectional policy that reduces reliance on any single power centre.
Strategic autonomy in the AI age will not come from remaining equidistant. It will come from cultivating multiple forms of proximity.
India and the Global South
India also seeks to speak for countries that fear exclusion from the AI revolution. Its hosting of the 2026 AI Impact Summit was intended to shift the international discussion from a narrow focus on frontier safety towards access, development and social benefit. The New Delhi Declaration called for affordable connectivity, democratised AI resources, locally relevant innovation and shared scientific infrastructure.
This is an important diplomatic opening. Many developing countries lack computing power, representative datasets, specialised talent and the regulatory capacity to assess imported systems. Without well-managed intervention, AI may deepen international inequality rather than reduce it.
India can offer a distinctive contribution through multilingual technologies, digital public infrastructure, low-cost applications and shared resources. It could develop open language models, public-interest datasets, safety benchmarks and specialised systems for health, agriculture, education and governance. Such technologies would be valuable not only within India but across Africa, Asia and Latin America.
But the “Global South” should not be treated as a unified bloc. Its countries differ in political systems, economic interests and technological alignments. Some will rely heavily on Chinese infrastructure. Others will prefer American platforms. Many will combine both.
India should therefore build coalitions around concrete functions rather than broad rhetoric: shared compute, language technologies, training, safety evaluation, digital public goods and bargaining power in standard-setting bodies.
This would transform India into a provider of international technological public goods.
AI, war and strategic stability
AI’s military implications may be the most dangerous dimension of the new geopolitics.
Artificial intelligence can accelerate intelligence analysis, identify targets, operate autonomous systems, support cyberattacks and generate deceptive content. It may also create a powerful, risk-laden bias towards speed. Governments that fear being outpaced by an adversary may automate more functions and shorten decision cycles.
It has been argued that AI risks tipping the balance from patient diplomacy towards coercive and kinetic action. Automated systems may initiate an action-and-reaction sequence before political leaders and human intelligence can interpret intentions or control escalation.
For India, with two nuclear-armed neighbours and unresolved territorial disputes, this danger is immediate. A machine-generated warning could be wrong because of faulty intelligence, corrupted data, model error or deliberate deception. Yet in a compressed crisis, leaders may feel compelled to act before the uncertainty has been better analysed.
India should pursue military AI but establish strict limits on autonomy in decisions involving lethal force, nuclear command and major escalation. Human control must mean more than placing a nominal operator at the end of an automated chain. It is crucial to preserve sufficient time and authority for genuine political judgement.
India should also advocate international confidence-building measures. These could include commitments not to target nuclear command-and-control systems with autonomous cyber capabilities, crisis communications concerning AI-related incidents, and transparency around certain categories of highly autonomous weapons.
No comprehensive treaty may be possible soon. But the absence of perfect verification cannot justify the absence of diplomacy.
Who writes the rules?
The competition to govern AI is also a struggle over political values.
The United States emphasises innovation, national security and private enterprise. Europe stresses risk classification and legal accountability. China favours state authority and political control. India speaks increasingly of inclusion, democratic diffusion and development.
India’s position could be influential because it occupies several worlds at once. It is a large developing country, a democracy, a technology power and a strategic partner of the West that continues to defend autonomy in international affairs.
But moral authority abroad will depend upon practice at home. India cannot persuasively champion democratic AI while permitting opaque algorithmic systems, unchecked surveillance or automated decisions that citizens cannot challenge.
The Indian government’s establishment of an AI Governance and Economic Group in April 2026 recognises that AI policy must span regulation, economic strategy, employment and national positioning. Its mandate includes examining regulatory gaps, labour-market effects and India’s international governance strategy.
That work should lead to a clear domestic framework for high-risk AI systems, independent audits, transparency in public procurement and meaningful human review. A democratic AI power must demonstrate that innovation and accountability can coexist.
From autonomy to agency
India’s goal should not be merely to avoid dependence. Dependence is rarely eliminated in a deeply interconnected technological system. The objective must be strategic agency: the ability to shape options, influence standards and make choices that others must take seriously.
That requires domestic scientific depth, advanced research institutions, hardware and systems expertise, energy planning, patient capital and the capacity to attract and retain exceptional talent. It also requires India to produce technologies valued by others. Another pointer is China’s success in attracting talent which reflects a broader truth: twenty-first century competition will be decided not only by armies and markets, but by who can attract, nurture and inspire human capital. The question is whether India can create an ecosystem that attracts and retains the best minds from across the world.
A country gains geopolitical influence not simply because it possesses technology, but because other countries depend upon what it provides.
India’s digital public infrastructure offers one possible foundation. Its multilingualism offers another. Its democratic experience may enable it to articulate an alternative to both corporate technological oligarchy and authoritarian digital control.
India should aspire to be neither a subordinate member of an American technological bloc nor a defensive representative of an undifferentiated Global South. It should become a pivotal power in a plural AI order.
Conclusion
Artificial intelligence is redrawing the map of international power. Compute is becoming a strategic resource. Data centres are becoming critical infrastructure. Semiconductor access is becoming an instrument of diplomacy. Technology companies are acquiring attributes once associated with sovereign states. Military decision-making is moving towards machine speed.
India enters this age with significant assets but no assurance of success.
It may become a vast market for systems built elsewhere, an indispensable reservoir of technological labour and a preferred site for foreign data centres while remaining dependent at the decisive frontiers. Or it may convert scale into capability, partnership into leverage and strategic autonomy into strategic agency.
The task is not to follow the United States or China. It is to build an Indian model of power suited to an interdependent and fractured world: open but not vulnerable, sovereign but not isolationist, technologically ambitious but democratically accountable.
India’s place in the AI order will not be determined by declarations of leadership. It will be determined by whether it can create knowledge, command critical capabilities, build indispensable partnerships and offer the world something neither of the dominant powers can provide.
That is the geopolitical opportunity before India. It is also a challenge that we must take with the utmost seriousness.
