In an unprecedented situation, ceasefire prospects have been further complicated, and the risks and regional anxiety of a complete collapse of the ceasefire or of the deal on the table have heightened. At first glance, it may appear to be a preventive escalatory action by Iran to deter Israel from a barrage of strikes on Lebanon and targeting Hezbollah. However, deeper introspection reveals that this may be a strategic move to capitalise on the opportunity to impose indirect kinetic pressure on Iran, thereby further coercing it to take the negotiations seriously and develop an exit plan.
The Strategic Picture
The Iranians have been witnessing extreme pressure on their most crucial proxy network, Hezbollah. Despite ceasefire guarantees from the US, Israel continued the bombardment, causing havoc in Lebanon and even reaching a situation where boots on the ground in southern Lebanon were on the cards. But as Israel began bombing Hezbollah’s strongholds in the Dahieh suburb of Beirut, and the ceasefire appeared to be just a piece of paper, Iran shifted from seeking a ceasefire to direct preventive kinetic action against Israel, as it cannot afford to see its strongest regional proxy actor in Iran’s Axis of Resistance severely weakened and lose its strongholds. Iran’s giving up its restraint has opened the gates for the resumption of the conflict that began in February and was de-escalated in April. A closer examination of the current situation suggests that a twin opportunity is indirectly staring both the US and Israel in the face, and it is not the first time that dual-escalation control through strength has been used to coerce and build kinetic pressure.
The Tripwire
Israel may be executing a calibrated tripwire strategy to steer negotiating dynamics, especially the ceasefire deal between Iran and the US. Israel is stepping up strikes on Hezbollah, knowing that putting immense kinetic pressure on Iran, despite paper assurances, will test Iranian patience, leading Iran to step on the tripwire. As a result, Iran launched direct strikes on Israel, giving Israelis strategic room for two actions. First, Israel takes an active role in ceasefire negotiations.
Until now, Israel feared that the US might announce a deal in a hurry, conceding to some of Iran’s demands, thus giving Iran regional strength in the long run and also meaning a humiliating and strategic loss for Israel at a sensitive juncture, with Benjamin Netanyahu standing on the brink of elections and facing immense domestic pressure. Second, it would allow the US to maintain indirect kinetic pressure on Iran, which until now was directly carried out by the US through surgical strikes. In the past, this tripwire strategy was in active focus during the Israel-Iran conflict, even decades ago, when Iran instigated Israel to ensure regional pressure and the isolation of Israel, and to threaten US credibility in the region. Last year’s strikes on Qatar by Israel are a key example that served Iran’s dual purpose. In 2014, during Israel’s decision to launch an offensive operation in Gaza codenamed Protective Edge, the trigger was the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, which led to a 50-day conflict with significant civilian casualties and failure to achieve strategic objectives. On the contrary, it helped Palestinians and radicals to unite and strengthen themselves. Now this is a strategic reversal of the tripwire strategy by Israel on Iran. While Israel has taken a risky escalatory route through a tripwire strategy for the US, this presents a two-way situation.
US’ Losing Grip or Pressure Tactics
The Trump-Netanyahu relationship is hitting bumps in this escalation game with Iran. On the one hand, Trump openly criticises Netanyahu and pushes for a ceasefire in Lebanon; on the other hand, Netanyahu is not seriously paying heed to Trump’s request. Israel has not minced any words in labelling these strikes as preventive or self-defence strikes and assured that it will continue. Most notable was the US intelligence community increasing threat level counter-Intelligence domain suspecting Israel’s Intelligence agency is spying on the US and mounting clandestine operations to gather Intelligence on the US-Iran deal progress. This has created some trust deficit at the operational level, giving a glimpse of the US losing its grip over Israel. The recent statements of Trump, in which he categorically said that “I call the shots and he doesn’t”, he further, according to a report, had planned to call Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to tell him not to respond to the first barrage of Iranian missiles. The Financial Times reported that the president said that Mr Netanyahu had no choice but to accept a deal with Iran.
All these developments clearly point out that Israel’s tripwire strategy against Iran became a strategic necessity for Israel to ensure it doesn’t get a bad deal where Iran gains, or Israel gets into isolation, where US-Iran strike a hurried deal in desperation of exit. But for the US, a flip in the strategic picture suggests it may be a deliberately staged indirect coercion through strong kinetic pressure. The US may have given a private or implicit green light to Israel to continue or intensify bombings on Hezbollah strongholds while criticising at the diplomatic level to up the ante against Iran indirectly and pressure regional actors to push Iran for a deal. A tripwire strategy purposely set by the US-Israel to instigate Iran, which can be read as a unilateral action from Iran and a provocation that can be internationally recognised, and if this had happened, it wouldn’t be the first time the US secretly gave tacit support for larger strategic objectives.
The 1982 Invasion of Lebanon: The Tacit Green Light
The Reagan administration publicly opposed any Israeli invasion of Lebanon, whether diplomatically or openly. However, privately, when former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited Washington, D.C., and met with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the situation was different. The meeting suggested divergent US intentions, as Haig indicated that the US would not actively oppose a limited Israeli invasion but imposed a strict condition. He told Sharon that US support or tolerance for Israeli actions depended on an “internationally recognized provocation”, essentially a “tripwire event” that would justify the invasion to the global community. Many analysts, citing declassified records, referred to this as a tacit “green light” to launch the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israel got its tripwire moment on 3rd June 1982, when the Abu Nidal Organization—a rogue militant group that was actually a bitter enemy of the PLO—attempted to assassinate Shlomo Argov, the Israeli Ambassador to the UK, in London. Even the PLO was not responsible for this attack. Israel launched heavy air strikes on PLO targets in Beirut, and when the PLO retaliated with heavy shelling, Israel escalated drastically by launching a full invasion of Lebanon. Even in this case, the US’s strategic objective was within reach. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon would weaken Syrian and Soviet influence in Lebanon and impact its regional influence in the Middle East.
Similarly, a similar story could have played out privately between Trump and Netanyahu, which is now deliberately criticised by US seeking an immediate ceasefire. Though Iran-Israel have halted the strikes, the real strategic intent and reality is a two-front corecin of Iran, both at the kinetic and non-kinetic levels. But still a larger question looms that disguised kinetic pressure may not achieve the full deterrent value needed to successfully coerce Iran and may instead further risk the resumption of conflict with yet another failed gamble.
