Perhaps after decades, a 9/11-style terror attack could be repeated in Israel, with an Omani co-pilot stabbing Indian pilot Smit Macchar, the captain, and putting the flight into a nose dive, leading to a rapid descent in altitude within minutes. However, the valour of Smit Macchar, who resisted and managed to open the cockpit door despite being badly injured, enabled passengers to overpower the Omani co-pilot and off-duty pilots to secure the cockpit.
A close examination of the incident raises three questions that may point towards a developing terror echo chamber. First, the Omani co-pilot is said to be a religious extremist, and according to some reports, was also “unusually too religious”. Second, the timing of the incident, just after a week, would mark three years since the 7th October attacks. Third, the majority of passengers on the flight were Jews. Fourth, and most importantly, the Israeli Prime Minister’s confirmation that he underwent radicalisation. This finding is concerning, as it confirms radicalisation imprints in this incident, further fanning the terror angle.
The Radicalisation Threat
The radicalisation pattern may be understood through ISIS radicalisation imprints. ISIS terror strikes can be classified into three patterns. The first is direct, in which ISIS carries out attacks. The second involves ISIS enabling an attack and indirectly participating, as seen in the 2015 Texas attack, where one attacker who opened fire at a community centre was in contact with ISIS through encrypted texts.
Third is inspired, where individuals carry out lone-wolf attacks on their own after becoming self-radicalised through ISIS online propaganda, such as the 2016 France attack, in which a self-radicalised man drove a vehicle into a crowd and opened fire, killing 80 people and injuring around four hundred. Later, ISIS claimed responsibility, but the driver had no direct link to ISIS. A critical incident was the 2017 Stockholm attack, where a self-radicalised man carried out a similar vehicle ramming and was later arrested; in this case, however, ISIS did not claim responsibility. During 2017, ISIS was under intense pressure, and its presence and capabilities were significantly weakened, helping US-led coalition forces defeat ISIS in Iraq by the end of the year.
In this case, the Omani pilot is most likely to be self-radicalised, as he has already been reported to be showing extremist tendencies and to have cultivated anti-Semitism and hatred against Israel and Jews. To further fan these tendencies, the ongoing Iran-US conflict, along with the third anniversary of the 7th October attacks, was just a week away. To strengthen this possibility, an examination of the Bondi Beach attacks last year in December during Hanukkah (eight-day Jewish winter festival of lights), where two gunmen carried out mass shootings on the beach, specifically targeting the Jewish community, revealed that the individuals involved (a father-son duo) had limited contact with local extremist networks in Sydney. However, their trajectory to the Bondi attack reflected decentralised, digital mobilisation that gave them a platform for self-indoctrination and inspiration to plan such attacks.
The very recent case of a Manchester ISIS-inspired plot, where in early 2026, Saadaoui and Hussein were jailed for life in the United Kingdom after plotting what police stated could have been one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in British history, further illustrates this pattern. Driven by Islamic State (ISIS) propaganda, the pair self-radicalised and spent months planning a mass-casualty gun attack targeting an anti-Semitism march and Jewish targets in Manchester, including Jewish nurseries, schools, synagogues, and shops.
Terror groups, specifically ISIS, have shifted their striking pattern significantly to remain off the radar and ensure their striking capabilities by employing indirect and inspired methods, either enabling any attack. An example of this was the Curtis Culwell Center attack in Garland, Texas, on May 3, 2015. One of the attackers who opened fire at the community center was in contact with ISIS through encrypted texts, or was inspired in a self-radicalisation way, as we saw in the Bondi Beach attack and possibly in this case as well, where the Omani pilot could either be indirectly in touch with Iranian-backed terror groups, which could have helped in indoctrination and enabling/facilitating this attack. However, such a possibility is least likely, as the whole scenario and actions of the Omani pilot suggest more of self-radicalisation, perhaps taking inspiration from Iranian-backed terror groups’ online propaganda, like ISIS does, and acting in a lone-wolf manner.
The propaganda mechanisms of terror groups are not new. In the past, when the Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union was at its peak, many engineers from Western countries were drawn to Jihadi propaganda magazines. Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK), also known as the Afghan Services Bureau, was the primary organisation responsible for recruiting foreign volunteers and channelling charity. Co-founded in 1984 by the prominent Palestinian Islamist ideologue Abdullah Azzam and Osama Bin Laden, the charity organisation published its signature Arabic-language propaganda magazine, Jihad Magazine (Al-Jihad).
The Terror Echo Chamber
These indirect and inspired methods of radicalisation and triggering terror strikes are creating another terror echo chamber, where detection remains limited and the threat of subversion and terror incidents remains high. India perhaps saw such imprints during the Red Fort blast case last year, where a few doctors are now said to be self-radicalised and associated with extremist online groups, possibly run by Pakistan-based terror groups. Online propaganda is creating a new terror echo chamber, where recruitment and identification do not rely on overt terror networks like those practised by Indian Mujahideen. It targets blue-collar workers in India through systematic recruitment networks run by sympathisers and subversive elements backed by Pakistan’s Intelligence agency, ISI. These inspired and indirect radicalisation methods have triggered flash terror incidents such as instant mass shootings, stabbing incidents, and lone-wolf suicidal attacks. What we saw in the Flydubai hijacking attempt is just a glimpse of this evolving terror echo chamber and shifting radicalisation models, which could be further developed by advanced technology because sheer luck and valour do not always become saviours.
Lessons For India
The Prahaar doctrine is a welcome step in recognising the threat posed by changing dynamics in terror-breeding environments, but the crucial challenge remains detecting and thwarting attacks; much more is needed to reform the counter-terror strategy and make it more network-centric, with the right balance of human and technical intelligence.
