Chinese President Xi Jinping articulated China’s eternal dream of exploring the vast cosmos, developing the space industry and building China into a space power. China’s actual dream is not limited to itself per se but extends to bringing anti-India states within its fold. The organisation called Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation (APSCO), a China promoted and sponsored alliance headquartered in Beijing with Pakistan as a founding member validates the Sino-Pak nexus.
With a growing insecurity about India, China is using an old playbook tactic to empower India’s enemy with technological power so that India will have to be entangled in regional disputes. A strategy to quagmire India in its own region will have another advantage for China: it would strip India of its grip on the South Asian region, thereby showing the world that India still has a long way to go before achieving superpower status. A partnership between Pakistan and China has not only regional implications but also impinges on international space law, this is therefore not merely a trilateral issue, because China is fuelling multipolarity among India’s adversaries in outer space under its ambitious “Space Silk Road.”
Orbital Slot Hoarding and ITU Loopholes
Pakistan, in its Space Vision 2047 has expressed its aim to launch geostationary and low Earth orbit satellites. China and Pakistan have a perennial association in the space sector. Pakistan’s recent launch of “PRSC-EO3” satellite from China’s Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre reinforces Sino- Pak alliance.
In GEO (Geostationary Earth Orbit) the region between 55°E and 65°E is heavily sought after for South Asia. During the period of 2020-24 Pakistan increased its filing with the ITU from 5 to 16 indicating its growing interest in securing orbital and spectrum resources in this strategic zone however, since Pakistan does not have an indigenous satellite launch vehicle unlike India and due to other administrative or budgetary constraints, it has lagged behind in deploying actual satellites into space at par with its applications. Under International Telecommunication Union (ITU) rules, nations are allotted slots on a ‘first come, first served’ basis and if a nation fails to avail those slots within the stipulated time which is normally a seven years from the date of filing, it loses the rights therefore the applications for undeployed satellites are dubbed merely as “paper satellites”. Pakistan therefore, seemed to have filed the applications with the intention of hoarding space slots and crowding India out of this sphere, which is identical to Chinese tactics.
Dual‑Use Technology Transfers
The transfer of dual‑use technology is another issue of concern. China has been instrumental in equipping Pakistan with systems that can be employed against India. China’s BeiDou navigation system, an alternative to GPS was officially integrated into Pakistan in 2014 and this partnership is now extended to military co-operation therefore, the Pakistani Army is well equipped to use BeiDou navigation. China’s announcement regarding a BeiDou-enabled continuously operating radar station network in Pakistan has exposed a gap in international space law.
Article IV of Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and Article VI makes states internationally responsible for national space activities, including those of private entities but is largely silent on indirect militarization and dual‑use transfers for example as to who bears responsibility if private companies execute cross border transfer of sensitive space capabilities to states that then employ them against another nation.
This ambiguity is troubling given Pakistan’s record of employing advanced weaponry against India, often via non‑state actors. Reports indicate terrorists in Kashmir use satellite communication devices based on BeiDou and commercially available navigation technologies. Pakistan could similarly exploit imaging satellites or communication relays for hostile purposes. This is the emerging face of space‑enabled conflict, where dual‑use technologies support conflict beyond traditional battlefields.
Satellites as Tools of Legal Warfare
Beyond military and surveillance risks, the China–Pakistan satellite partnership also opens the door to lawfare, the use of technology to build evidence against India in international disputes. Pakistan has long accused India of breaching the Indus Waters Treaty (1960), claiming that Indian dam and hydro‑project construction violates treaty provisions. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan’s satellites can now generate high‑resolution imagery of Indian river basins, dams, and irrigation projects.
Such imagery could be used in an international forum to portray India as being in non-compliance with the treaty. Even if India contests the accuracy or context of the data, the mere existence of satellite‑based “evidence” strengthens Pakistan’s diplomatic hand. This is a new dimension of space cooperation; satellites not only serve military or civilian purposes but also become instruments of legal and political leverage.
Here again, international space law is silent. There are limited norms governing the use of satellite data in treaty disputes, which provide latitude for selective or manipulated imagery to be weaponized in legal contexts.
Sovereignty and Data Governance Gaps
Another dimension of the China–Pakistan space partnership is the question of data protection. Pakistani satellites are capable of imaging Indian civil and military establishments. Such data collection may fall outside the practical reach of several Indian regulatory frameworks, including aspects of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and rules thereunder, particularly where the collected imagery does not constitute identifiable personal data. The question is therefore less one of privacy than of sovereignty, national security and data governance.
Principle XII of United Nation’s Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space known as UNGA Resolution 41/65 endows sensed state access to data about its territory on non-discriminatory basis with reasonable cost terms however these principles are non-binding in nature nor does it obligate sensing state to notify the sensed state especially when sensitive imagery is collected which results in regulatory vacuum
“Asia‑Pacific” Space Cooperation: A Contrast
In the absence of a comprehensive international legal framework, a usual practice in international politics for countries sharing common interests is to form organisations that can collectively legitimise their actions and advance their strategic objectives. A common feature of such organisations is the projection of peace and cooperation as part of their stated agenda. The Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), headquartered in Beijing and comprising countries such as Thailand, Iran, Mongolia, and Türkiye, is often cited as an example of this phenomenon. Ex facie, its projects include joint satellite missions, data-sharing for disaster management, and capacity-building for smaller states; however, in practice, China exercises significant influence over the organisation’s agenda, which countries such as Pakistan and Türkiye generally support. From this perspective, India’s decision to remain outside APSCO appears justified.
India’s Diplomatic Response
India needs to adopt a multi‑layered response. At the United Nations, it should emphasise reforms that extend liability principles to cover data abuse, dual‑use transfers, and third‑party privacy violations. Transparency obligations and mandatory reporting of technology transfers would be important first steps. At the bilateral level, India has to insist on non‑transfer clauses in its space cooperation agreements, drawing parallels with arms export control provisions, and push for end‑use monitoring to ensure compliance.
Maritime and regional security will remain vulnerable in absence of well-defined and effective space governance framework and therefore India should pursue a code of conduct through platforms such as the Quad, BIMSTEC, or the Indian Ocean Rim Association, linking responsible space governance to maritime and regional security. These arrangements could later evolve into global benchmarks similar to the Missile Technology Control Regime which began as a tiny group before blossoming into a widely accepted framework.
India should also propose the idea of an MTCR‑style regime for dual‑use space technology, beginning with voluntary guidelines among like‑minded states. Such a framework would restrict opaque transfers of launch vehicles, satellites, and navigation systems that can be repurposed for military use. India’s membership in MTCR gives it credibility to lead this effort, positioning itself as a norm‑entrepreneur in space governance.
Towards International Space Law Reform
China–Pakistan space cooperation demonstrates that its space nexus is not merely a geopolitical challenge; it exposes chinks in international space law’s armour. The Liability Convention fails to protect third‑party rights against harmful data collection or its misuse while it covers the physical damage resulting out of space objects. Similarly, the Outer Space Treaty is unable to clearly address the responsibilities of private companies that transfer sensitive technologies across borders.
India should therefore advocate broader reforms in international space law. These reforms must include provisions addressing third‑party responsibility in cooperative missions, notification rights when sensitive imagery is collected, and transparency in data‑sharing agreements. By spearheading these reforms, India can fill a critical gap in global space governance and ensure that outer space remains a domain of peaceful and lawful use.
Conclusion
The China–Pakistan space alliance exposes that the outer space has turned into a battleground where legal loopholes, dual‑use technologies, and opaque partnerships are actively being exploited to undermine security and sovereignty. For India, the challenge is not only to safeguard its interests but remain true to its ethos by leading efforts in reforming international space law. It is for India to actively endeavour to ensure that outer space remains a domain of peaceful cooperation rather than a theatre of conflict.
India should therefore strive to expand its diplomatic agenda beyond terrestrial disputes and take the lead in shaping the rules of engagement in the final frontier.
