India’s Oil Routes Under Pressure: The Strategic Implications of Dual Maritime Chokepoint Disruptions

by Anu Sharma

The simultaneous disruption of the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb has exposed one of the greatest structural vulnerabilities in India’s energy security architecture—its dependence on maritime supply routes passing through West Asia. While geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf have historically generated concerns regarding the security of oil supplies, the closure or disruption of two interconnected maritime chokepoints represents an unprecedented logistical challenge. Rather than merely reducing the availability of crude oil, such disruptions fundamentally alter transportation costs, shipping timelines, insurance premiums, refinery planning, and supply chain reliability. India, which is also the third-largest importer and consumer of crude oil in the world, this issue extends beyond energy security to include macroeconomic stability, trade competitiveness, and strategic resilience.

India imports nearly 85 percent of its crude oil requirements and West Asian region continues to be one of its main sources despite successful diversification efforts over the past decade. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Qatar have traditionally supplied a substantial share for India’s energy needs. Although Russian crude has assumed a much larger role since 2022, much of this also reaches India through maritime routes that intersect the same vulnerable sea routes. Asa result, the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb affect not only India’s traditional Gulf oil and gas suppliers but also alternative sources that depend on these maritime corridors for efficient transportation.

The strategic significance of these two chokepoints lies in their complementary role within the global energy transportation network. The Strait of Hormuz serves as the principal outlet for oil exports from the Persian Gulf, handling roughly one-fifth of globally traded crude oil. Meanwhile, the Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, enabling shipments moving through the Suez Canal toward European and Asian markets. When one route experiences disruption, exporters often attempt to reroute cargo through the other. However, simultaneous pressure on both eliminates this flexibility and forces tankers to undertake significantly longer voyages adding weeks to transit times and substantially increasing transportation costs.

The immediate result of such disruptions is not necessarily an absolute shortage of oil and gas resources but a sharp decline in supply. Longer travels reduce tanker availability because vessels remain at sea for extended periods. Shipping companies will then eventually require additional vessels to transport the same quantity of crude, increasing freight rates even if physical oil production remains unchanged. Simultaneously, insurance premiums rise dramatically as shipping companies classify the affected maritime zones as high-risk areas. These additional costs then become part of the landed price of crude imports, placing pressure on domestic fuel prices. For India, higher transportation costs have broader economic implications than temporary fluctuations in international crude prices. A sustained increase in import costs widens the current account deficit, exerts downward pressure on the rupee, and complicates inflation management. Rising fuel prices also increase production and transportation costs across sectors, affecting manufacturing, agriculture, aviation, logistics and consumer goods. So, energy price shocks rapidly transmit throughout the wider economy, influencing both inflation expectations and overall economic growth. The disruptions also present operational challenges for Indian refiners. Refinery scheduling depends on predictable shipping timelines and stable inventory management. increased transit times require refiners to maintain larger inventories, adjust procurement schedules and optimise refinery throughput under uncertain delivery conditions. While India’s strategic petroleum reserves and commercial inventories provide temporary buffers, prolonged logistical disruptions increase inventory management costs and reduce operational flexibility.

In the current situation there is a distinction between supply diversification and route diversification. Over the past several years, India has successfully diversified crude suppliers by increasing purchases from Russia, the United States, Latin America and Africa. However, supplier diversification alone does not eliminate maritime vulnerabilities if a significant proportion of imports continue to depend upon a limited number of sea lanes. The present crisis shows that even geographically diverse suppliers remain connected through common shipping corridors, making maritime security as important as supplier diversity in ensuring energy resilience. The evolving situation also highlights the growing interaction between geopolitics and global supply chains. Energy markets today are not driven solely by production capacity or demand fundamentals but increasingly by the security of transportation infrastructure. Maritime chokepoints have become strategic assets whose disruption generates cascading effects across global trade networks. Oil prices respond not only to physical shortages but also to uncertainty regarding future deliveries, transportation costs and inventory availability. Consequently, geopolitical instability translates into financial volatility long before actual supply shortages emerge.

India’s experience during previous regional crises has strengthened institutional preparedness. The government has expanded strategic petroleum reserves, diversified import partners, encouraged long-term procurement contracts and enhanced maritime surveillance capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Indian refiners have also demonstrated considerable flexibility by adjusting crude procurement in response to sanctions, conflicts and market disruptions over recent years. These measures provide important buffers that reduce immediate vulnerability. Nevertheless, strategic reserves primarily address temporary supply interruptions rather than prolonged increases in transportation costs and shipping delays.

Another important implication concerns India’s broader maritime strategy. The Indian Ocean has increasingly become the principal arena where energy security and national security intersect. Safe SLOCs have become indispensable for sustaining economic growth, industrial production and external trade. Consequently, maritime domain awareness, naval deployments, international anti-piracy cooperation and partnerships with regional navies acquire greater significance not merely from a defence perspective but also as essential components of economic security. Protecting commercial shipping has evolved into a critical national interest for major energy-importing countries, including India. The disruptions also strengthen the strategic importance of energy transition without diminishing the continuing centrality of hydrocarbons. India has made significant investments in renewable energy, electric mobility, green hydrogen and biofuels to reduce long-term dependence on imported fossil fuels. However, crude oil will continue to remain indispensable for transportation, petrochemicals, heavy industry and aviation for the foreseeable future. Therefore, energy transition should be understood as a process of reducing future vulnerabilities rather than eliminating present dependence. Until alternative energy sources achieve greater scale and commercial viability, securing reliable oil imports will remain an essential component of India’s economic strategy. The current disruption shows that energy security extends far beyond the availability of crude oil itself. The resilience of maritime logistics, shipping networks, insurance markets, port infrastructure and naval security collectively determine the stability of global energy flows. India’s diversified sourcing strategy, expanding strategic reserves and improving maritime capabilities provide valuable resilience against short-term disruptions. Nevertheless, the simultaneous pressure on both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb serves as a reminder that maritime chokepoints remain among the most critical strategic vulnerabilities in the global energy system. For India, ensuring uninterrupted access to these sea lanes will continue to be central to sustaining economic growth, industrial competitiveness and long-term energy security in an increasingly uncertain geopolitical environment.

  • Dr. Anu Sharma is an Assistant Professor at the Amity Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Amity University, NOIDA. Previously, she has been associated with the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi as Research Fellow with research interests related to various subjects associated with the West Asian region. She has published and presented various papers on foreign and domestic politics of Iran and the broader West Asian region both nationally and internationally. She has also published a book titled “Through the Looking Glass: Iran and its Foreign Relations” in the year 2020 through KW Publishers which was co-published by Routledge in the year 2022. She also on the reviewer panel of Scopus indexed journal Journal of Strategic Security, published by the University of South Florida, US and Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (AJMEIS), published by Shanghai International Studies University (SISU). She is also the regular columnist with The Week and her weekly column “Gulf Watch” discusses the pertinent issues related to geopolitics, regional politics and foreign policy of the Gulf region.

    She has credible experience as a freelancing journalist with “The Statesman” newspaper, New Delhi as part of her Graduation programme. She holds a Masters degree in Politics with Specialisation in International Relations from the School of International Studies (SIS), JNU and an M.Phil. degree from the American Studies division of Centre for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies (CCUS&LAS), SIS, JNU. She has done her Ph.D. from Centre for International Politics (CIP), School of International Studies (SIS), Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar (Gujarat).

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