The just-concluded 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, held with pomp and ceremony, drew global attention as a gala event of non-Western emerging powers; the interest exhibited by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in it deserves separate analysis. This is because the Association has long established itself as the regional voice of the small and middle powers of Southeast Asia, emphasizing consultation and cooperation (rather than coercion) on issues of regional significance. Juxtaposed with the BRICS motto, the two organizations resemble similar objectives. BRICS is increasingly viewed in Southeast Asia as an embodiment of the ongoing shift in the world order marked by Western domination, through which Southeast Asian countries can diversify their economic and diplomatic engagements. In this context, India and the ASEAN see eye to eye since both want to exercise their strategic autonomy through diversification policy without conforming to the ‘west vs. the rest’ binary. BRICS symbolizes the emergence of agency in the Global South with an objective to salvage the world order from the Washington-London-Brussels labyrinth. Traditionally, India and the many Southeast Asian countries have been committed to this mission, now reflected at the BRICS platform. At the same time, India and ASEAN countries find in BRICS a common ground to handle emerging geo-economic challenges.
Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who attended the BRICS Summit in New Delhi on invitation as ASEAN Chair and Outreach Country, said ASEAN will engage with BRICS on advancing peace, inclusive growth, sustainable development and rule-based international order. Emphasis on rule-based order is understandable since the Philippines is currently entangled in a sovereignty dispute with China over the South China Sea’s uninhabited islands. The Philippines, wary of Chinese domination, is justifiably looking for expansion of its support base. At the same time, it wants to avoid confrontation with the Asian giant and therefore looks for a diplomatic way of handling the crisis. Although ASEAN is a useful platform for the purpose, it is comprised of members who cannot counterweight China the way BRICS members like Russia and India are expected to do. In a way, BRICS caters to the Philippines by providing an opportunity to lessen Chinese domination through entangling with a larger forum where Chinese dominance is countered by powers like India and Russia. Notably, at the sidelines of the BRICS Summit, India and the Philippines held discussions to widen strategic partnership spanning defence, trade, space and infrastructure. The Philippines bought the shore-based version of India’s BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile in 2022 and deliveries of the launch systems began in April 2024. Therefore, the Philippines, as ASEAN Chair, has a vested interest in engaging the Southeast Asian Association more closely with BRICS.
BRICS is attracting other ASEAN members longing for strategic autonomy amid growing uncertainty in the global economic and political landscape. According to the Vietnamese ambassador to India, through engagement, Vietnam aims to contribute to the overall success of BRICS, helping strengthen the voice of developing countries, while it will provide Vietnam with additional space to diversify markets and partners. At the invitation of Prime Minister Modi, his Vietnamese counterpart Le Minh Hung attended the New Delhi BRICS Summit. Vietnam became BRICS’ partner country in 2025. For Vietnam, BRICS is another non-Western platform to integrate with outside ASEAN. Bigger than the Southeast Asian bloc, BRICS opens a platform for Vietnam to counter Chinese domination as Hanoi-Beijing relations sustain latent tension. Uncomfortable with Chinese activities in the South China Sea and neighboring Cambodia, Vietnam presumably finds BRICS, compared to ASEAN, more effective in helping Hanoi handle China. This author’s personal interactions with scholars in Hanoi ten years back highlighted the growing disillusionment in Vietnam over ASEAN’s effectiveness in countering Chinese domination. India and Vietnam agreed to strengthen defense and maritime cooperation at the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. Since Vietnam cannot afford confrontation with China, BRICS offers an alternative way of handling it. As BRICS is not a conventional geopolitical alliance, it helps Vietnam strengthen ties with India and maintain strategic cooperation with the United States, Japan and Europe, while continuing relations with China. This approach goes with a similar strategy of India, which traditionally has been averse to any confrontational power politics.
Another partner state, Malaysia, also sees BRICS as an emerging market to engage with amidst the global economic system gasping under US tariff onslaught and regional conflicts. Malaysia’s engagement with BRICS is seen as an opportunity to extend its economic and diplomatic reach into major emerging markets like India, which is its largest trading partner in Asia. Indian companies had 293 approved manufacturing projects in Malaysia worth US$2.95 billion as of June 2026, which is expected to create 28,455 jobs. Indonesia, the sole ASEAN member of BRICS, on the other hand, views the Association as a means to boost Global South influence, where it wants to play an active role. Jakarta finds in BRICS the potential required to rally like-minded nations to build global trade and supply chain systems resilient enough to withstand turbulence.
Therefore, BRICS is increasingly becoming attractive to the ASEAN countries for their respective strategic as well as common economic interests amidst the ongoing global economic turbulence. This attraction towards BRICS seems beneficial for India both for economic as well as strategic reasons. India has long wanted to integrate further with the vibrant Southeast Asian economies. The growing appreciation of India’s economic and technological potential among the Southeast Asian countries, attracting them towards BRICS, opens new opportunities for both sides to enhance collaboration. At the same time, their point of convergence over wariness about China and similar approaches to handle the challenge offer India the prospect to maneuver its China strategy multilaterally with Southeast Asian partners. Association with these countries helps India thwart BRICS turning into a China-dominated club, while India’s presence extends similar assurance to the Southeast Asian countries vis-à-vis India without opting for any confrontational path. Also, India’s traditional non-confrontationist approach in international affairs, championing consultation over coercion, fits in with ASEAN’s international policy. It is opined that, for Southeast Asia, India’s presence in the BRICS acts as a balance in the grouping, thwarting it from turning either anti-West or solely China- and Russia-driven. India and the ASEAN countries maintain a balanced approach among the current warring factions in the international arena. Therefore, BRICS offers both India and Southeast Asia a platform to exercise their economic as well as strategic interests without conforming to a ‘West v/s rest’ binary, which thus attracts the ASEAN countries towards this non-Western association.
