Despite renewed speculation, an “Islamic NATO” remains highly unlikely. Deep internal rivalries, enduring dependence on the United States, structural constraints, and competing strategic interests make the emergence of a cohesive military alliance improbable.
Recently, there have again been reports and speculation about a potential “Islamic NATO” being formed by many Muslim countries, driven by shifting geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, especially following the recent US–Iran conflict, as well as developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and South Asia. Countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others are said to be working towards it, with the possibility of further expansion to other Muslim countries. Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khawaja Muhammad Asif, recently stated that Qatar and Turkiye may soon join the existing defence pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. He further noted that “this arrangement has been partially finalised; it is in the process.”[1]
Structural Constraints
It is also reported that the two new inclusions could create a new axis that combines Ankara’s military experience and defence manufacturing base, Islamabad’s nuclear deterrent and ballistic missile capability, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s financial muscle.[2] However, this proposition, which has been discussed for a long time, is not practically feasible because of structural limitations and internal contradictions. This idea gained prominence after the Saudi–Pakistan mutual defence pact, signed in September 2025, under which an attack on one is deemed an attack on both. Following this, speculation arose that this arrangement could be extended to other Muslim countries.
However, there are significant limitations. First, these countries have long-standing strategic ties with the United States. For example, Saudi Arabia has a deep strategic partnership with the US, hosts US military bases and facilities, and depends on the US for security and defence cooperation.[3] Therefore, it cannot be part of any grouping that directly undermines US interests. Similarly, as a NATO member, Turkey also faces limitations on what it can say and do.[4] It cannot align with other regional groupings that may be anti-US or anti-Israel, since its position within NATO entails commitments and obligations that constrain actions that could undermine allied interests.
Pakistan also has a long-standing political, security, and economic relationship with the United States and continues to maintain deep ties with Washington. It occasionally receives U.S. military assistance, particularly for the sustainment and maintenance of its F-16 fleet. Pakistan is also a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States, a designation that enables closer defence cooperation and entails certain privileges and responsibilities. Moreover, Pakistan relies on financial support from the International Monetary Fund, where the US holds significant influence. Consequently, Islamabad has limited room to pursue policies that fundamentally challenge broader US strategic interests. [5]
Defence Cooperation Does Not Constitute a NATO
Beyond this, rivalries exist within Muslim countries, including those between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and, importantly, the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. These tensions stem not only from geopolitical competition but also from differing strategic visions, ideological orientations, and competing spheres of influence.[6]
Other dynamics are also at play: these countries maintain important relations with external partners. For instance, Saudi Arabia enjoys strong ties with India and is unlikely to allow those relations to deteriorate, given the growing importance of economic and strategic cooperation between the two countries. Riyadh also views India as a key partner in advancing its Vision 2030 agenda, owing to the depth of bilateral trade, investment, energy cooperation, and broader economic linkages.[7] Although Saudi Arabia has signed a mutual defence pact with Pakistan, it has largely remained one-sided, with Pakistan providing security-related support to Saudi Arabia in return for financial benefits. As a result, Riyadh is unlikely to allow its engagement with Pakistan to come at the expense of its relations with India.[8]
Moreover, the idea of an “Islamic NATO” rests on the assumption that U.S. involvement in the Middle East has declined due to recent developments. However, this assumption is flawed, as the U.S. remains deeply engaged in the region, with extensive military bases and a strong strategic presence. Therefore, the idea that U.S. influence is diminishing is not fully grounded. Additionally, not every form of defence cooperation can be described as “NATO”; as former Indian Ambassador Sunjay Sudhir has observed, the so-called “Islamic NATO” is “more sound than substance” and “a tag far removed from the ground,” noting that “what we are seeing in West Asia doesn’t yet resemble” NATO.[9] Similarly, political scientist Amalendu Misra has argued that Muslim-majority states are fiercely protective of their sovereignty, casting doubt on the emergence of a NATO-style alliance.[10]
NATO is a specific institutional framework with formal collective security mechanisms and integrated military structures, and not all emerging arrangements meet that definition. Even if such an alliance were eventually to take shape, its strategic significance would likely be diluted by the natural process of counterbalancing in international politics. States that perceive such a grouping as threatening to their security or regional interests would be expected to strengthen cooperation among themselves. Countries such as Israel, India, Cyprus, and other like-minded regional actors would naturally move towards closer strategic coordination to offset such a bloc. This is a well-established pattern of state behaviour in which states confronted with perceived threats seek to balance against concentrations of power rather than allow a single coalition to dominate.[11]
Furthermore, any assumption that such groupings could involve sharing or pooling nuclear weapons is unrealistic. As William Alberque, former Director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre, has observed, NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements are “a unique historical exception” that predated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and were taken into account during its negotiation, rather than a model for new alliances. Consequently, any attempt to replicate such arrangements would face significant legal, political, and diplomatic obstacles within the broader international non-proliferation architecture, including the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards. It would likely provoke widespread international opposition and diplomatic repercussions, making such cooperation neither legally nor practically feasible.[12]
China Factor in an Islamic NATO
Even if an “Islamic NATO” were ever to materialise, it would likely be largely symbolic, as these countries are constrained in the decisions and actions they can take. There would be little substantive coordination. Moreover, even if such an alliance did form, it would likely be directed more towards Iran than towards any other actor. It could also raise concerns about growing Chinese influence, particularly through Pakistan. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), between 2020 and 2024, China accounted for around 81 per cent of Pakistan’s arms imports, making Beijing Islamabad’s dominant weapons supplier.[13]
SIPRI also identifies Pakistan as the largest recipient of Chinese arms exports during this period, underscoring the depth of the China–Pakistan defence relationship. The bulk of Pakistan’s military inventory is now of Chinese origin, and defence, security, and intelligence cooperation between the two countries has expanded significantly in recent years. Pakistan has also increasingly served as a platform for promoting Chinese military technology and defence exports in the Middle East, raising questions about the extent to which any such grouping could remain independent of broader Chinese strategic interests. The US would not allow any grouping that undermines its interests or those of its allies in the region.
The copyright of this article remains with the Politeia Research Foundation ©️PRF.
References
[1] NDTV News Desk, “Pakistan Closer to ‘Islamic NATO’? Khawaja Asif Says Turkey, Qatar to Join Defence Pact with Saudi Arabia,” NDTV, June 17, 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-closer-to-islamic-nato-khawaja-asif-says-turkey-qatar-to-join-defence-pact-with-saudi-arabia-11488220
[2] “Turkey in Talks to Join Pak-Saudi NATO-Like Defence Deal: Should India Be Worried?” India Today, January 13, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-news-turkey-in-talks-to-join-pak-saudi-nato-like-defence-deal-should-india-be-worried-bloomberg-2851070-2026-01-13
[3] “U.S., Saudi Arabia Strengthen Ties Through State Partnership Program,” U.S. Department of Defense, August 8, 2025, https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4284178/us-saudi-arabia-strengthen-ties-through-state-partnership-program
[4] NDTV News Desk, “Why Attacking Turkey, a NATO Member, Is a High-Risk Bet for Iran,” NDTV, March 31, 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/why-attacking-turkey-a-nato-member-is-a-high-risk-bet-for-iran-11170883
[5] International Monetary Fund, Pakistan: First Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement, Requests for Waivers of Applicability of Performance Criteria, Modification of Performance Criteria, and for Rephasing of Access—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Pakistan, IMF Country Report No. 24/17 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, January 19, 2024), https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2024/english/1pakea2024001.pdf
[6] Camille Lons, “Power Struggle: What the Saudi-UAE Rivalry Means for the Red Sea—and Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, January 29, 2026, https://ecfr.eu/article/power-struggle-what-the-saudi-uae-rivalry-means-for-the-red-sea-and-europe
[7] “India–Saudi Bilateral Relations,” Embassy of India, Riyadh, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, accessed July 7, 2026, https://www.eoiriyadh.gov.in/page/india-saudi-bilateral-relations
[8] Reuters, “Pakistan Deploys Jet Squadron, Thousands of Troops to Saudi Arabia During Iran War,” Reuters, May 18, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-deploys-jet-squadron-thousands-troops-saudi-arabia-during-iran-war-2026-05-18
[9] Nitin A. Gokhale, “Islamic NATO: The Gulf Between Rhetoric & Reality,” StratNews Global, January 25, 2026, https://stratnewsglobal.com/the-gist/islamic-nato-the-gulf-between-rhetoric-reality
[10] “Major Islamic Powers Won’t Let ‘Muslim NATO’ Dent Their Sovereignty – Expert,” Sputnik International, January 13, 2017, https://sputnikglobe.com/20170113/muslim-nato-pakistan-sharif-1049572738.html
[11] Anushree Jonko, “Inside Benjamin Netanyahu’s ‘Hexagon’ of Alliances and Why He Wants India in It,” NDTV, February 24, 2026, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/inside-benjamin-netanyahus-hexagon-of-alliances-and-why-he-wants-india-in-it-11131109
[12] William Alberque, The NPT and the Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements, Proliferation Papers No. 57 (Paris: French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), February 7, 2017), https://www.ifri.org/en/studies/npt-and-origins-natos-nuclear-sharing-arrangements
[13] Imran Khurshid, “How Pakistan Enables China’s Expanding Defense Presence in the Middle East,” Middle East Forum Observer, July 2, 2026, https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/how-pakistan-enables-chinas-expanding-defense-presence-in-the-middle-east
