The first serious backchannel talks, or Track-1.5 dialogues, between two countries began in 1987, when India was engaged in Operation Brasstacks, a massive war exercise by the Indian armed forces at the Indo-Pak border in Rajasthan. The Pakistan military dictator Zia-ul-Haq visited India in February under the pretext of watching the India-Pakistan test match at Jaipur. During the trip, Zia-ul-Haq threatened Rajiv Gandhi, If some reports or accounts are to believed Zia said “Mr Rajiv, you want to invade Pakistan? Ok fine, go ahead! But please remember one thing that after that, people will forget Changez Khan and Hilaku Khan and will remember Zia and Rajiv Gandhi only,”… He further said, “Because it will not be a conventional war. Pakistan may suffer annihilation, but Muslims will still survive because there are several Muslim countries in the world. But remember, there is only one India, and I shall wipe out Hinduism and the Hindu religion from the face of the earth!”
Zia-ul-Haq’s bluster came against the backdrop of Operation Brasstacks, a major military exercise by the Indian Army near the Pakistani border in Rajasthan. The operation involved heavy mobilisation of around 10,000 troops, including infantry, mechanised units, air assault capabilities, and armoured divisions. After threats and tensions between the two countries simmered, government-to-government intervention (Track-I) led to the phased withdrawal of troops and de-escalation. After de-escalation, effectively a Track 1.5/intelligence-led Track dialogue was brokered between India and Pakistan by Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, owing to his unique family ties with both countries. Prince Hassan bin Talal was uniquely positioned to act as a neutral intermediary. His wife, Princess Sarvath el-Hassan, had deep roots in both nations. She was born in Kolkata, India; her father became a prominent Pakistani diplomat after Partition, while her uncle, Mohammad Hidayatullah, stayed in India and rose to become the Chief Justice and Vice President of India.
The First Track
The Track dialogue began with intelligence-led talks between the spy chiefs of both countries, the then R&AW chief A.K. Verma and the then ISI chief Hamid Gul, aimed at de-escalating the situation, but it had only a temporary effect. The ISI chief, Hamid Gul, was a hardliner and played an instrumental role in strengthening the financial support for the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets. Though this track dialogue helped to defuse escalation, nothing significant happened on the broader set of security concerns, including terror and covert funding to terror in J&K. After 1989, J&K saw a steep rise in terrorist activities, especially the emergence of various outfits. Many analysts in Indian intelligence agencies call him the architect, or godfather, of jihadi terrorism in J&K, especially for ensuring the rise of Hizbul Mujahideen.
After the groundwork laid by an intelligence-led backchannel, which yielded only limited results, the first Track-II dialogue, the Neemrana dialogue, comprised academics, retired diplomats, and military officials. Unlike Track-II, Track-I.5 diplomacy often has the direct sanction of the government, but in the 1991 Track-II dialogue, both governments are said to have given tacit approval. Even this dialogue had limited success. It can be argued that the emergence of new regional and strategic realities after the Cold War in 1991, and India’s decision to open its economy, became key push factors for Pakistan to engage with India to discuss trade and economic opportunities amid a geopolitical shift in the world order. The Neemrana dialogue (Track-II diplomacy) saw only paper talks and discussions, mostly on political points of contention like J&K, border conflicts, and terror, and rarely did anything move beyond discussion into genuine conflict resolution. The only limited result that the Neemrana dialogue could produce was the opening of a channel for engagement, which became a tool for limited conflict management.
The Failing Track
After engaging with India at the Track-II level, India witnessed the 1993 bomb blasts and a surge in terrorist activity, while border conflicts with Pakistan reached a tipping point during 1998-1999. Under the Vajpayee government, another series of secret talks took place between the two countries, with R. K. Mishra, a close confidant of Vajpayee, on the Indian side, and Niaz A. Naik, former Pakistan Foreign Secretary, on Pakistan’s side, conducting multiple rounds of secret negotiations to resolve the Kashmir issue. In fact, the negotiations came close to a breakthrough, with both negotiators drafting a long-term solution for Kashmir and establishing a four-point framework that included a planned visit by Nawaz Sharif to New Delhi.
However, the Pakistan military under Gen. Pervez Musharaff sabotaged the negotiations. Musharaff bypassed the ISI chief, Gen. Ziauddin Bhat, who was close to Nawaz Sharif, in the planning for Kargil. When Niaz A. Naik returned to Pakistan with almost everything prepared, the Pakistan military refused to cooperate and rejected the peace initiatives. The military further intensified this rejection upon learning of leaks of these secret negotiations in the media. The Pakistan military feared that any peace or complete normalisation with India would strengthen the civilian government and render the military irrelevant. Moreover, ideological hardliners (anti-India) believe, as Pakistan’s Green Book, authored by mid-ranking Pakistan Army personnel, says, that the Pakistan Army is not only the protector of territorial sovereignty but also of ideological frontiers. These hardliners’ beliefs and the military’s power fever completely sabotaged any possibility of a peace initiative with India.
The Agra Summit and Covert Talks
After the Kargil War, the Agra Summit between Vajpayee and Musharraf took place, but even that peace initiative failed due to Musharraf’s insistence on making Kashmir a core issue, his refusal to agree on other fronts like nuclear, trade and cross-border terror, and the cabinet’s rejection of Pakistan’s demand for being inflexible. After the Agra Summit’s failure, Parliament attacks occurred, and both countries came to the brink of war, leading to a stand-off (Operation Parakram). The intent of the Agra Summit can be described as Musharraf’s deliberate move under pressure, as he faced legitimacy issues on the domestic front after the coup, along with economic pressures and US pressure on regional security after the Kargil War. To further exacerbate this pressure, Vajpayee’s push had put immense diplomatic pressure on reciprocation.
In other words, Musharraf was seeking a recalibration opportunity and a strategic pause, which the Agra Summit offered. It can be further argued that after the Agra Summit’s failure and the Parliament Attacks, both events allowed Musharraf to manage US pressure that had increased tremendously after the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan. Musharraf also saw this as an opportunity to divert attention and bolster the credibility of his rule at home. After the 2001-2002 standoff, secret backchannel talks again began to take shape in 2003. Vajpayee nominated his NSA Brajesh Mishra, and Musharraf named Tariq Aziz for talks. This led to initial progress, with both sides reaching at least a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC). After the government in India changed following the general elections of 2004, the then NSA J.N. Dixit took charge. Still, after his sudden death in 2005, Satinder Lamba took over the talks with Aziz. By 2007, both negotiators had reached a framework on the Kashmir issue by establishing a joint mechanism, granting more autonomy to both sides of Kashmir, and demilitarisation.
Kayani- Pasha Era
However, the agreement was never signed, as Pakistan was rocked by political instability, and in 2008, India witnessed horrific terrorist attacks (26/11), leading to the complete derailment of talks and dialogue between the two countries. In fact, the hardliners in the ISI and the Pakistan military establishment took advantage of the weakening of Musharraf’s grip on the domestic front. After Musharaf’s decline, Asharaf Kayani was appointed as Pakistan Army chief, and Shuja Pasha was appointed as ISI chief. Both hardliners and ideologically hardened generals played an active role in derailing the Aziz-Lamba secret negotiations and preventing them from materialising, either indirectly or by orchestrating the 26/11 attacks through the Pakistan-backed terror group LeT under their Kayani-Pasha watch. Both of them further attempted to veto any scope for talks after 26/11. Both of them weaponised the “memogate issue”. Following the secret US raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan’s civilian leadership (via Ambassador Husain Haqqani) allegedly sent a secret memo to the US military seeking help to prevent a potential coup by the Pakistan military establishment. Kayani and Pasha weaponised this memo, framing it as treason. They dragged the civilian government to the Supreme Court, creating a massive political crisis. This memogate issue defanged the PPP government, and under enormous pressure from the Pakistan military, they dared not initiate any Track diplomacy or secret negotiations with India. The Kayani-Pasha era showed how the Pakistan military remained ideologically hardened against India and had a hunger to remain in power and remain relevant.
Sharif and the Modi Government
The Prime Minister paid a surprise stopover in Lahore for Sharif’s granddaughter’s wedding, a symbolic gesture of diplomatic goodwill, and perhaps signalled a desire to engage directly with civilian leadership. However, this visit again became an eyesore for the Pakistan military establishment and the ISI. Barely a week after the immense optimism generated by the Lahore visit, the Pathankot attacks carried out by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) on 2nd January 2016 occurred. It can be argued that the ISI deliberately staged them to derail any peace initiative in the offing. The then Army Chief, General Rahil Sharif, and the ISI chief, Rizwan Akhtar, even hijacked the Joint Investigation Team constituted by the Sharif government to investigate the attacks. Still, the Army and the ISI ensured the investigation went into cold storage. In October 2016, details of a secret meeting between Sharif and the ISI chief were leaked in Dawn, where Sharif warned the ISI chief and the military establishment to take action against terror groups. After the leak, the Pakistan Army chief made all-out attempts on Sharif, which led Sharif to sack his loyalists (trusted Information Minister Parveiz Rasheed and Special Assistant to the Foreign Affairs Tariq Fatemi).
Track diplomacy was almost dead but was revived during General Bajwa’s tenure, when R&AW and ISI officials held talks, and at least a ceasefire at the LoC was re-established. Soon after, even that was broken following the 2022 heightened attacks from the Pir Panjal Valley and the later Pahalgam attacks last year. After Operation Sindoor, Pakistan seems to be again working on Track diplomacy and engaging in secret negotiations, but this again appears to be a strategic pause, a diplomatic diversion to manage pressure and isolation after the ongoing West Asia crises almost crippled Pakistan’s economy. At the diplomatic level, Pakistan has almost lost leverage to negotiate or mediate the US-Iran deal. Talks at whatever level are happening cannot run on a contradictory impulse, where at one end India has made its stance clear, declaring terror from Pakistan as an act of war, and on the other end, engaging in negotiations.
Pakistan’s diplomatic and political pain points, such as the IWT treaty, are red lines that cannot be negotiated unless Pakistan delivers a significant breakthrough. As far as conflict management and fears of escalation go, the onus is on Pakistan. Politically valued talks have no meaning in the current dynamics. The talks will only have some constructive value when Pakistan stops terror or is ready to make significant efforts. Until then, talks are a mirage because, for Generals, they are a strategic tool for pressure management and diversion, not a genuine tool of diplomacy.
