It is quite clear from Trump’s changing statements that he has no clear idea how to end the war that he and Israel have declared on Iran. The US has the power to keep bombarding Iran, but to what strategic end?
Trump seems to have calculated initially that he could intimidate the Iranian regime into yielding to his demands on eliminating its nuclear programme, limiting its missile capability, and curbing its destabilising regional role by massively deploying US military forces in West Asia.
This show of military strength did not work, much to the public’s surprise, despite his adviser, Steve Witkoff, who wondered why Iran had not buckled under the pressure. Trump then delivered a major blow by green-lighting the decapitation of the top leadership of Iran: the Supreme Leader, along with several members of his family and the senior-most Iranian generals. The calculation that this would break the back of the clerical regime and that a leaderless Iran would collapse has proved to be mistaken.
Trump’s hope that this surgery at the top would induce the opposition elements that had earlier staged widespread street revolts would mobilise to bring about a regime change from within proved illusory as the supporters of the regime staged massive street demonstrations of solidarity. In his usual scrambled pronouncements that show a lack of a clear strategy, Trump has commented that those in Iran whom the US had identified as people to negotiate with have been killed.
In Trump’s own public remarks, it appears that he seriously misjudged Iran’s capacity to resist. He seems to have believed that, as in the case of the 12-day war in June 2025, when Iran did not want to escalate and made token retaliatory attacks against the US base in Qatar, this time too Iran would not seek an all-out confrontation with the US, notwithstanding all its warnings. The US was mistaken in this regard.
The planning for the war, therefore, seems to have been shoddy, based on wishful thinking rather than a hard appreciation of facts on the ground. It is inconceivable, however, that US military planners, with all the war gaming exercises that they do, did not foresee the nature and scope of Iran’s response in a worst-case scenario. Either the obvious seems to have escaped them, which is unlikely, or the culture of sycophancy that has developed in Trump’s entourage to the extent of pandering to his idiosyncrasies would explain why he might not have been offered firm and frank professional advice.
Iran had publicly stated that it would attack US military bases in the region in case of US/Israeli aggression. This was the obvious retaliatory step they would take. These bases are there to provide security to the Gulf states, primarily against threats from Iran. The US has heavily invested in this region, and Iran would obviously seek to target its economic interests there. The overall Iranian objective in an existential war would be to destabilise US presence in the region, even if it is at the cost of its own interests, especially in the UAE, which is a hub for networks that enable Iran to bypass Western sanctions.
It is astonishing that Trump should express surprise that Iran should strike at its neighbours, and even confess that this was not anticipated.
The claim that the US was not using its bases in the Gulf to attack Iran is unconvincing. The location of powerful radars in them, the downing of three US aircraft by “friendly fire” in Kuwait, and the reported presence of US refuelling aircraft in a Saudi base would suggest that these bases were part of the US military machine attacking Iran. The fact that the Israeli and US planes used the airspace of the Gulf countries to attack Iran gave the latter additional cause to violate their sovereignty and territorial integrity by attacking the airports, ports, and other civilian targets on their soil.
Whenever the issue of a US/Israeli attack on Iran has been visualised, the fear that the Strait of Hormuz may be blocked has been expressed in all geopolitical analyses. It defies any rational explanation that Trump should not have anticipated this eventuality, especially as blocking the Strait through which 20% of global supplies of oil and gas pass would inevitably cause a spike in the price of these commodities. This has grave implications for the oil-driven world economy as a whole, including that of the US, even if it is the largest producer of oil, because the price of oil is globally set, and the rise of the price of gasoline at the pump in the US creates a popular backlash in the country. Trump has to be watchful of this in view of the mid-term elections to the US Congress in November this year.
It is for this reason that Trump has not yet attacked the oil installations at the Kharg oil terminal through which Iran exports its oil, 80% of which goes to China. He has attacked only the military installations there, opening up the possibility of a limited ground operation. But this would mean putting boots on the ground and an eventual mission creep because to secure the foothold there, the Iranian coast will have to be secured too. This would be politically dangerous for Trump domestically, as it would create dissension in his MAGA base.
Astonishingly, Trump says that after he has “won the war”, it is “unfair” of Iran to close the Strait. The rationality of this argument is questionable. Frustrated by the degree of Iranian resistance, Trump, who unleashed a war against Iran entirely on his own volition, is now asking his European and Japanese allies to join in opening the Strait. He is agitated that US allies do not want to become belligerents in this war, which some have publicly declared as illegal and lacking a UN mandate. Trump, with his usual impulsive lashings out, has threatened to walk out of NATO, threatened Spain, and, in particular, the UK, for not standing by the US when the US demanded support. At the same time, he claims that the US really does not need any help from anyone and that he was merely testing the responses from US allies. His call for a Board of Peace for Hormuz on the pattern of the Board of Peace for Gaza has been ignored.
The war has to end at some stage. Trump seems to be exploring an off-ramp, as they say. Iran is rejecting talks at this stage. For Iran, this is an existential struggle. It cannot place trust in any peace agreement with Trump because twice now the US has engaged with Iran in negotiations, and twice during their course the US has attacked Iran. The US and Israel have made it clear that they want to get rid of the clerical regime in Iran. For those who hold power in Iran, including the IRGC, this means the US acquiring control over Iran’s resources and foreign policy and Israel exercising unchallenged hegemony over the region in the future with US backing. The stakes are very high on both sides. The US cannot accept defeat, and neither can Iran. The question is who has greater staying power.
For India, a prolonged conflict would be most costly. Sustained high oil and gas prices would have an impact not only on the economy but also entail social costs. The dynamism of our growing ties with the Gulf countries, where we have vital interests, will be disturbed. The model of growth and development. and the technological future of the Gulf countries, especially the UAE, in partnership with India, will be called into question. India will find it challenging to maintain a balance between our ties with Israel, Iran, the GCC countries, and the US, with each of whom we have compelling interests.
Our presidency of BRICS this year will test our diplomacy even more than our very successful Presidency of the G20 did. Iran is a member of BRICS, and so are the UAE and Saudi Arabia. How will we be able to build some consensus language that is acceptable to both sides? Russia and China, both permanent members of the Security Council, have diplomatic and economic cards to play that India does not have. India’s relations with the US, which has triggered this war, have a different political complexion than those of Russia and China. We will have to consult closely with Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, and Indonesia to draft a consensus, which we will no doubt do.
This unwanted war presents unwanted disruptions of our ties with West Asia.
