The much-debated Islamic NATO dream in the Middle East may have seen some light, at least on paper. Still, a closer examination suggests that this pact is symbolic, aiming to readjust to the evolving strategic reality of the Middle East. The examination of this pact also shows that, instead of promoting regional security and stability, it creates a closed space for strategic competition and asymmetry in the balance of power.
The Pact
The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement is a trilateral defence pact among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. The three core provisions include a mutual defence clause, under which an act of aggression or armed attack on Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Pakistan triggers a collective response. Second, Defence and Intelligence Cooperation mandates broad military coordination, joint training, and strategic defence collaboration, and it also establishes an intelligence-sharing mechanism. Third, Defence-Industrial Integration lays the groundwork for joint manufacturing and co-development of military equipment.
The Politics of Balance
Internal balancing in the Middle East has always been a top strategic priority whenever the region is rocked by conflicts, especially those that strongly affect regional and domestic dynamics. Perhaps the first such internal balancing occurred after the Arab Uprising to address internal regime challenges and lay formal groundwork for police and internal security cooperation. A GCC Internal Security Pact was signed in 2012. It was heavily utilised by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to police domestic dissent, especially that inspired or supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. Similarly, the Baghdad Pact in 1955, pitched as the “Middle East Treaty Organisation” (METO) to keep Soviet influence in check, was signed by Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan on the initiative of the US and UK.
The strategic intent was to ensure survival and internal stability, both of which were threatened by the rising spirit of Arab nationalism in the region. For instance, the Iraqi regime heavily utilised this pact to seek Western aid, intelligence sharing, and police training to fortify its domestic security apparatus and neutralise internal opposition. Still, despite that, the 1958 military coup overthrew the Iraqi monarchy. Interestingly, a pact was signed five years earlier to counterbalance Iraq by Egypt – the Arab League Joint Defence Treaty, which committed member states of the Arab League to treating an attack on one as an attack on all. It was heavily promoted as a collective regional security initiative. While the initial aim was to counter Israel’s influence after its establishment as a new state, a close examination of the treaty suggests that, instead of utilising it as a collective security pact, it was used for internal balancing and counterbalancing. Egypt used the treaty heavily as a vehicle to counter the growing influence of Iraq’s monarchical regime in the region, as there were fears of a shifting power balance towards Iraq. The Egyptians believed that Iraq’s regime would absorb Syria and Jordan under a “Fertile Crescent” plan, which would marginalise Egypt’s regional leadership.
A pivot in regional alignment came into focus during the Gulf diplomatic crisis that began in 2017. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt cut ties with Qatar and imposed a strict blockade against Qatar, viewing Qatar’s foreign policies and strategic behaviour as a threat to regional stability. Qatar was moving away from the Saudi-Emirati sphere of influence and pivoting towards Iran and Turkey. This pivot threatened the balance of power and the sphere of influence. The intra-Gulf states’ struggle finally ended in January 2021, when the Al-Ula Agreement was signed by Saudi Arabia and its allies, restoring diplomatic, trade, and travel ties with Qatar.
Last year’s pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was also pitched as a collective defence clause with ambitious joint defence cooperation, but that too was heavily utilised by Pakistan for its internal regime legitimacy and economic stabilisation. The first time was in 1982, when the then Pakistani military dictator Zia-ul-Haq desperately required economic support and, most importantly, legitimacy to rule, signing a 1982 defence pact with Saudi Arabia. Zia’s regime got economic support and a branding bandwagon, which Zia utilised to legitimise and strengthen its domestic grip by projecting his regime as defender of Islam and broadening the idea of Islamic revival.
But soon the cooperation was tested during the Gulf War in the 1990s. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saudi Arabia demanded direct Pakistani combat support. Afraid of domestic blowback from Pakistan’s own pro-Iraq public and anti-Western religious groups, Islamabad sent troops but strictly restricted them to a defensive, non-combat role inside Saudi Arabia.
Similarly, in 2015, when Saudi Arabia requested Pakistani troops, naval ships, and aircraft for its coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, the Pakistani Parliament held a vote and unanimously chose to remain neutral. Islamabad prioritised its own internal security. Even last year’s defence pact was rendered symbolic, with Pakistan committing to act if Saudi Arabia is attacked, along with other defence cooperation. When the Houthis recently attacked Saudi Arabia, the Pakistani military didn’t act against them. A question is obvious: why Saudis engage with Pakistan, and the answer is again the politics of balance or internal balancing, where three reasons drive Saudis to engage with Pakistan. First, Sunni solidarity and historic support for Pakistan. Second, Saudi’s own domestic security, which has Pakistan’s strategic presence, especially when Saudi is faced with an internal threat from radicals. Third, the balance game between Pakistan and Iran. Saudi wants to contain or at least keep Iran’s influence in check from expanding to other frontiers by keeping Pakistan under Riyadh’s orbit. Saudis are not only keeping Iran’s influence in check but also ensuring not to let Pakistan slip into Iran’s influence by normalising or reapproaching them.
In sum, this pact politics is driven by three reasons rather than the rhetoric of regional security or stability—first, containment of a rising power. Second, counterbalancing through low-cost alternative strategic mechanisms. Third, securing core interests. All three reasons behind this pact politics are clear. Sign a deal to contain and counterbalance a rising regional power, or its influence, both internally and externally through strategic mechanisms such as pact or alliance politics, while further preserving core interests from being compromised or affected. As discussed above, Iraq, Egypt, and the Saudis historically signed pacts to contain, counterbalance, and preserve core interests against Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Qatar. External power involvement, like the US, plays the role of a catalyst in balancing these pacts by supporting its regional allies.
The Mecca Defence Pact
This Mecca pact allows Saudi Arabia to reapproach its relations with Turkey and further engage with Ankara to preserve its economic and strategic vision within its ambitious 2030 framework and contain Iran’s influence. Turkey’s normalisation with Saudi Arabia offers strategic and economic benefits, especially by giving Qatar a stronger position in the region, as this normalisation will strengthen Turkey-Qatar relations, and Saudis will gain strong diplomatic room to engage with Qatar. For Pakistan, it will provide some degree of strategic depth, as usual with the Saudis. Still, it will enhance its cooperation with Turkey and help build its economic capacity and asymmetrical military capabilities.
In short, it is a pact aimed at strengthening Sunni solidarity and giving strategic space to major Sunni players in the region to recalibrate and safeguard their core domestic interests at both the economic and strategic levels, especially in a situation where a new front against the Saudis has almost opened by Iran-backed Houthis. This Sunni solidarity gives the Saudis considerable space for negotiation and strategic cooperation. For the region, it hardly delivers any strong, realistic promise on paper, except to give the US a more comfortable opening through this pact politics. Iran’s hardened strategic resilience and survival capabilities are now proven, and containing Iran through this diplomatic encirclement, dubbed a pact, would push Iran into a riskier position, threatening regional stability. Pact politics provide a gateway to strategic reset or adjustment, especially when major regional players face pressures on their core domestic interests. Historical precedents tell us that pact politics is less about the region and more about internal balancing and management of the sphere of influence.
