Some sense of diplomacy and peace has prevailed in West Asia after the US-Iran deal was signed. However, its durability remains questionable. India’s strategic response to almost five months of conflict in the Middle East has attracted critical attention. A section of analysts argues that India sided with Gulf partners, mainly the US-Israel axis, and left Iran alone, which has emerged as the winner of this conflict. The one-sided affair in the Middle East has cost India, but this perspective is not entirely true. The lenses through which India’s crisis diplomacy is evaluated need some revision, but there are lessons to be drawn.
India’s Crisis Diplomacy
India’s crisis diplomacy has long focused on stability management and balancing. The infusion of a non-alignment approach reflected a sense of slow pragmatism or strategic restraint, aimed at better balancing hard-power relations. Perhaps the first real instance of crisis diplomacy came during the Korean War in the 1950 s. India’s diplomatic stability was managed through non- alignment, refusing to align with any bloc. New Delhi voted for UN resolutions condemning North Korean aggression but abstained from resolutions authorising the use of force. India maintained its diplomatic balancing and stability, serving as a mediator and offering a neutral medical unit instead of combat troops. India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and authored the UN resolution on Prisoners of War (POWs), bringing a peaceful end to the hostilities.
Within three years, India faced its first heat from the Middle East during the Suez Canal Crisis, which disrupted international trade, especially imports of industrial machinery and food. A prolonged war in the Middle East threatened India’s economic stability. India condemned the Anglo- French invasion as a return to old imperialism. At the same time, India worked closely with the United States and the United Nations to de- escalate the situation. India carefully balanced its anti- colonial stance with its reliance on Western economic aid. India co- sponsored the UN resolution demanding the withdrawal of foreign forces. It also contributed significantly to the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to maintain peace in the region.
India’s crisis diplomacy had three essentials that aligned with key principles of crisis diplomacy: stabilisation, communication, and balancing, but the way it was executed complicated matters. For example, India’s muted response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait under Saddam Hussein’s leadership faced criticism. However, I. K. Gujral’s visit to Iraq and a quiet diplomatic approach enabled the safe repatriation of around 170,170,000 Indians trapped in Kuwait, according to some reports. An informal hug with Saddam Hussein sent mixed signals that impacted India’s position during the 1991 Gulf Crisis.
Vajpayee Era’s Crises Diplomacy
However, during Vajpayee’s tenure, that positioning began to exhibit calibrated pragmatism that maintained effective communication, balance, and, most importantly, stabilisation at the domestic front when faced with extreme pressure on the diplomatic and economic fronts. India began a strategic de-hyphenation and adopted a multi-vector engagement in the Gulf, laying the groundwork to increase its influence in the region. The first major step was cultivating ties with Israel and bringing Indo- Israel relations out of the shadows.
In 2003, Ariel Sharon became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit India; the visit signalled that India was no longer driven solely by Arab considerations and strategic restraints, but by strategic pragmatism that guided national interests. In another example of a pragmatic approach that same year, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami was the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day. The two nations signed the Delhi Declaration, focusing on energy security and a strategic partnership. Most notably, India diversified its energy portfolio with the Gulf by moving towards hydrocarbons with Saudi Arabia, not just transactional oil purchases.
However, the Vajpayee government’s policy faced a major test, similar to the one the VP Singh government faced during the 1991 Gulf War. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted India’s response, as India was beginning to realign strategically with West Asia. India adopted a balancing approach, but this time it was not reactive and chaotic, unlike in 1991.
At the economic level, the Vajpayee government managed its energy security through aggressive public contingency planning, diversified commercial contracts, and open diplomatic manoeuvring with OPEC. By 2003, India’s economic growth was accelerating, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing oil consumers. The Ministry of Petroleum utilised this “demand leverage” during open interactions with OPEC ministers.
Vajpayee’s crisis diplomacy reflected a quiet but pragmatic approach and proved successful. This also marked a subtle departure from strategic restraint and slow pragmatism under the NAM strategy and began to open the gates for strategic autonomy-tuned crisis diplomacy.
Crises Response in the US-Iran
Cut to the US-Iran war. India’s critical diplomacy came under intense scrutiny, with critics calling it a failure of strategic autonomy and of India’s Gulf policy. Primarily, the critics base their arguments on three counts. First, India was fracturing its position due to a muted response and leaning towards one side of the axis during the war. Second, stability issues on the domestic front. Third, the Pakistan factor during the negotiations.
The way these issues were handled can be debated, but India’s crisis diplomacy is not entirely at fault; rather, it once again proved that its grand strategy-tuned crisis diplomacy is resilient and maintains stable crisis management. The counter to the first criticism, that India had a muted or fractured position, causing misalignment in the Gulf during the war, is that there was never any question of alignment. Crisis diplomacy simply means maintaining stability under extreme pressure and headwinds, and India remained open to all Gulf partners, especially Iran. The goodwill gesture of strategic financial and logistical commitments in Chabahar port played a crucial role in India’s engagement with Iran.
During the conflict, India actively leveraged back-channel diplomacy with Iran to safeguard its energy supplies and economic stability. Following the June 2026 US-Iran peace agreement and the subsequent 60-day US sanctions waiver, the dividends of these backchannel talks became clear. Iran immediately agreed to support India’s energy recovery by offering a rapid resumption of hydrocarbon and crude oil trade. There has been minimal impact on Indo-Iran ties, and India managed to ensure its strategic stability, the first key pillar of crisis diplomacy, unlike Pakistan, where its domestic and economic front was almost collapsed. In a nutshell, India was not aligning but managing and balancing. Therefore, the argument that India completely abandoned Iran is meaningless and unfounded. Diplomatic rhetoric may justify it, but actual crisis diplomacy won’t.
The second argument is that there were stability issues on the economic and domestic front, but that is also not entirely true. India’s back-channel talks and neutrality, along with rapid diversification of oil trade, led to some relief in economic statistics despite strong headwinds that put immense pressure on the government’s fiscal position. Economic statistics show that India absorbed a massive fiscal hit but successfully prevented a domestic collapse, allowing the country to emerge from the 2026 crisis with its foundational growth intact. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) maintained its 6.5% GDP growth projection for India for the 2026–27 fiscal year, citing incredibly robust domestic consumer demand. Successfully maintaining stability and emerging from crises is further proof that India’s crisis diplomacy delivered the right tactical and strategic responses to address issues stemming from conflict.
The third and most spotlighted argument is Pakistan’s claim that it has emerged as a key regional player or has reactivated its depth in the Gulf, while India silently watched. Pakistan’s role in the negotiations was no less than propaganda, with passing papers projected as peacemakers, whereas the Qataris played the real role. Despite staging so-called Islamabad talks in Pakistan and Munir’s so-called shuttling, both miserably failed. Critics don’t realise that Pakistan has limited depth in the Gulf and has not had a strategic hold for a long time, as it lacks strategic leverage and persuasive value. The spin on strategic autonomy in the Gulf will automatically push key actors towards promising, rising markets that India is ready to provide. Therefore, the wrong projection of Pakistan must be read and noted with full consciousness.
In short, India maintained stability, balance, and, most importantly, communication, even when it was backchannel in most cases. Ultimately, it passed the stress test of crisis diplomacy, and the critical reading perhaps arises from reading too much between the lines or from paying attention only to the stack rather than the spin.
However, there are a few crucial lessons ahead that India must learn to make the execution of crisis diplomacy clearer and more direct. There is still strategic restraint at times, which can send mixed signals, such as not condemning the assassination of the Iranian supreme leader, but later sending the Foreign Secretary to the Iranian Embassy to express condolences. The wait-and-watch approach (quiet diplomacy) in crisis diplomacy sometimes affects the balance and communication aspects of crisis diplomacy, or even conflicts with it, and must be addressed by showing calibrated assertivity, for which strategic autonomy is fundamental – voicing assertively for the fulfilment of India’s national interests. In sum, apart from a few minor issues, India’s strategic response and grand strategy, which guide crisis diplomacy, have shown promise as a right and stable crisis management strategy in this unpredictable and anxiety-driven global order.
