Multipolar Asia: India’s Strategic Play at Tianjin

by Kanwal Sibal

Prime Minister Modi’s participation in the SCO summit in Tianjin, China, was timely. India, as an Asian power, must have a presence in any broad Asian organisation so that it can register its views and priorities in agenda setting and during deliberations. Those in India who question the relevance of the SCO to India’s interests should remember that if we stand away from such an Asian-Eurasian organisation, we will allow ourselves to be confined to “South Asia”.

After Modi’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Kazan last year at the BRICS summit that led to some reduction of tensions at the border and some decisions to restore pilgrimage, tourism and aviation links, it would have made no diplomatic sense for Modi not to attend the SCO summit because the situation in eastern Ladakh has remained unresolved with no tangible progress towards de-escalation and de-indiction of troops. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang YI had visited India to prepare for Modi’s visit to Tianjin. A ten-point agenda for addressing the issues between India and China was identified.

Given the state of relations, Modi could not have made a bilateral visit to China, as that would have implied a significant breakthrough in ties. The SCO summit, however, gave him an opportunity to be in China in a multilateral context and resume engagement with China at the highest level, with Xi Jinping.

In his public remarks at the meeting with Xi Jinping, Modi recalled that in 2024, he had had very productive discussions with him, which gave a positive direction to bilateral relations, and that after the disengagement at the border, an atmosphere of peace and stability was now in place. He also noted that Special Representatives of the two countries had reached an agreement on border management.

According to Foreign Secretary Misri’s detailed briefing on the talks between the two leaders, it has emerged that they agreed that the two countries were primarily focused on their domestic development goals, and in this, they were partners rather than rivals. Much has been made of this formulation, which, in fact, is not new, as it figured in the joint statement issued on the occasion of President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006, which said textually that the two countries “are not rivals but are partners for mutual benefit”.

Importantly, Modi made the point that a functioning multipolar world order had a multipolar Asia at its heart. This is a point India makes repeatedly with China’s ambitions to be the dominant power in Asia. He also underlined an important point delicately that peace and tranquility in the border areas were needed for continued and smooth development of bilateral relations. The issue of reducing India’s trade deficit with China was raised.

The SCO’s focus on terrorism, extremism, and separatism is most relevant to India’s own enduring concerns. In his address to the SCO plenary meeting, Modi laid stress on the importance of unity in the fight against terrorism. He recalled that for the past four decades, India had been bearing the grave scars of ruthless terrorism. He drew attention to “the most heinous face of terrorism in Pahalgam”. With Pakistan in mind, he asked the question whether the open support for terrorism by certain countries could ever be acceptable to us, and called the double standards on terrorism unacceptable. This message was addressed to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who was around the table, and China as well, glossing over Pakistan’s involvement in terrorist attacks against India.

On connectivity, Modi mentioned initiatives such as the Chabahar Port and the International North-South Transport Corridor, through which we can enhance our linkages with Afghanistan and Central Asia. With an eye on the CPEC, he made the point that “every effort towards connectivity must uphold the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity”. The reference to “our shared Buddhist heritage” was a reminder of India’s civilisational contribution to the region.

The Tianjin summit gave an opportunity for a Modi-Putin dialogue after Putin’s meeting with Trump at Alaska and before his visit to India in December for the annual summit. The atmospherics of the Modi-Putin interaction at Tianjin were exceptionally warm. The two leaders spoke for forty-five minutes privately in Putin’s presidential limousine, when Putin no doubt briefed Modi on the Alaska meeting, his perspectives on the road to peace, not to mention his views on the positions taken by Europe and Zelensky. This would have been most helpful in Modi’s own conversations with European leaders, especially Macron, and Zelensky, too, in light of the responsibility that Trump and the EU are putting on India to play a role in persuading Putin to come to the negotiating table.  This interaction in the car was followed by delegation-level talks, which underlined the importance both sides attach to the continuing consolidation of their ties.

For the West, the biggest message that came out of Tianjin was that of the visuals of Putin, Modi, and Xi Jinping having a relaxed conversation together. For US political, think tank, and media circles, Russia and China getting together is considered an existing reality by the West, however strategically challenging, but Russia, India, and China getting together is viewed with some alarm. With democratic India joining a powerful authoritarian camp, the balance of power is seen as shifting decisively away from the West. The US is seen as risking consolidating a powerful geopolitical and economic front against itself .Questions have been asked in US circles whether alienating India and “losing “ it with punishing 50% tariffs is not a failure of US policy.

This SCO summit was used by China to organise a massive military parade with a display of a impressive new advanced weaponry. This was a message of deterrence to the US and to Taiwan, not to mention to the region where China is making expansive territorial claims. At a more global level, China has conveyed a sense of power that will no doubt backstop its economic and trade objectives, besides boosting Chinese arms sales. Trump remarked that China expected him to watch the parade, which he said he did, and called the display impressive.

Modi’s participation in the summit after a serious downturn in US-India relations was also a reason why the summit generated considerable interest in US media and political circles. As far as India is concerned, Modi’s participation was not linked to Trump’s gratuitous targeting of India, though the timing was such as to open itself to be interpreted as a message to the US that India had wider political options as part of its strategic autonomy. The US has, in the last couple of decades, seen India as a partner in countering China’s expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region, with the Quad fitting into this US geopolitical strategy in Asia. For US observers, therefore, India and China drawing closer undermines this strategy and weakens the US hand in dealing with China.

The Tianjin SCO Declaration has reshaped the SCO agenda, broadening it to parallel the declarations issued by the BRICS summits. The SCO has thus become a platform for Asian/Eurasian states to also promote multipolarity, as this is inherent in the willingness to pronounce on virtually all the issues on the international agenda, apart from regional issues.

Of note, from India’s point of view, is the strong condemnation of the Pahalgam terrorist attack and the call to bring the perpetrators to justice. China’s vision of a community with a shared future for humanity is balanced with India’s vision of conducting dialogue based on the concept of “One Earth, One Family, One Future.” India joined in the condemnation of Israel’s military aggression against Iran. Surprisingly, on the Palestine issue, there is no direct condemnation of Israel and no call for a two-state solution. An important initiative is to create an SCO Development Bank. There is a call to continue implementing the “Roadmap for Expanding the Share of Local Currency Settlement among the SCO Member States.”

  • Kanwal Sibal

    Kanwal Sibal is a distinguished Indian diplomat and former Foreign Secretary of India. Over a career spanning decades in the Indian Foreign Service, he served as Ambassador to Turkey, Egypt, France, and Russia. He currently serves as the Chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi, continuing his engagement with policy, academia, and public discourse.

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