After almost six months, the fragile silence at the Af-Pak border between the Taliban and Pakistan seems to have run out of patience. Pakistan carried out multiple air strikes on Afghanistan yesterday, killing around a dozen people, including women and children. The attack is significant as it comes amid deadly attacks by terror outfits, especially one by ISKP.
As the Af-Pak region witnesses a gradual erosion of strategic patience and restraint, leading to an almost complete derailment of ties between Islamabad and Kabul, the so-called strategic depth has now become a mere symbolic strategy for Pakistan with no substantive value. In such a scenario, New Delhi has the opportunity to recalibrate its Afghan strategy to develop its own strategic depth.
The Camaraderie And Dual Strategy
The Taliban enjoyed Pakistan’s patronage for decades, from the Afghan-Soviet period until 1999, when the Taliban became part of Pakistan’s strategic depth strategy against India. They allowed the Pakistan-based terror group LeT to operate from the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, using Kabul as a training and logistical base to carry out terror activities in India. This strategic depth approach proved successful in destabilising J&K from the late 80s to the 90s. Khost, Jalalabad, and Kandahar provinces became key training centres for terror organisations. After 9/11, the Taliban was ousted by the US’s war on terror, especially through the CIA’s Operation Jawbreaker. Even after this ousting, Pakistan managed to reorganize its strategic depth approach via the Haqqani network. The Haqqanis and core leadership were redeployed to the FATA region, particularly North Waziristan, with significant help from Pakistan’s ISI.
While Pakistan publicly supported the US in its war on terror, covertly, it nurtured and strengthened the Haqqanis through criminal syndicates and financial organizations in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan revived its strategic depth when the ISI’s S Division, responsible for managing terror proxies, established a network of operations to strengthen and link the Haqqanis with other terror groups, training LeT and Jaish in the FATA regions. The Haqqanis’ first attack against India was the bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008, followed by a second attack on the embassy in October 2009. Until 2011, Haqqani, through Pakistan’s ISI, continued to strike India’s strategic positions, including consulates, infrastructure projects, and training centers. This resulted in India scaling back its presence and missions, impacting its strategic and tactical footprints in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s dual strategy of providing public support to the US and conducting covert terror activities yielded favorable results on two fronts. First, it helped Pakistan maintain plausible deniability by exploiting Haqqani’s complex web of operations and its connections with other terror groups, which makes attribution difficult. Additionally, Pakistan argued that it lacks control over the tribal areas. Second, it enabled Pakistan to sustain its strategic depth strategy even after losing Taliban influence in Afghanistan. Later, Pakistan engaged the Haqqanis to moderate the TTPs, which were becoming a serious threat to Pakistan. Till 2021, Pakistan focused on a hybrid strategy emphasizing political work, logistical, and financial support of Haqqanis and terror proxies.
Breaking Strategies and Camaraderie
The fall of Kabul in 2021 was celebrated in Pakistan, and fears of strategic depth resurfaced. However, Pakistan soon realised it was not dealing with the old Taliban; it was confronting a new version of the Taliban with altered strategic realities. The new Taliban sought autonomy and legitimacy, becoming increasingly assertive, which led to border clashes, economic and political tensions, and, most importantly, the TTP factor. Pakistan expected the Taliban to moderate the TTP as well. Still, it did not receive the desired response from Kabul, which resulted in the collapse of the ceasefire between the TTP and Pakistan.
Pakistan’s ISI’s last hope was to rely on its most trusted group—the Haqqanis, who had previously mediated and negotiated with the TTP. However, that too failed as the Haqqanis lost influence amid conflicts with the Taliban, especially after clashing with the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, over taxation in Haqqani-controlled areas and the treatment of women. The Haqqanis, considered relatively moderate, oppose Akhundzada’s hardline policies. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of the Haqqani network, is now at ideological and political odds with Akhundzada. The loss of the Haqqanis, ongoing conflict with the Taliban, and the threat from the TTP have nearly ended Pakistan’s strategy of strategic depth, and the recent deadly clashes and full-scale offensives have officially marked the end of Pakistan’s strategic depth in Kabul. However, Pakistan has a plan to adapt to the new reality, but it’s a difficult task, especially as India is also preparing to carry out its own influence campaign in Kabul to limit Pakistan’s remaining options.
Old But A Failed Playbook
The strategic reallocation of Taliban and Haqqani core leadership in the FATA region, along with the opening of cross-border Jihadist networks, gradually turned into blowback for Pakistan. A sense of autonomy and a hardline ideological framework within the Global Jihadist network were breeding in the FATA region. Al-Qaeda perhaps played a significant role in the formation of the TTP and in persuading jihadist groups to turn against Pakistan. The formation of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), an Islamic militant organisation formed in 1992 to overthrow the Pakistani government, resurfaced after 2001 under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad, but by 2002, the Pakistani government under Pervez Musharraf ordered a crackdown that led to Mohammad’s arrest. However, the group continued to resurge under Mohammad’s son-in-law, Maulana Fazlullah, who took control of the movement, became notorious, and started “Mullah Radio,” a pirated FM radio station broadcasting Sharia law. The most significant incident occurred in 2003 when Al-Qaeda carried out two failed assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf from South Waziristan. Other groups, like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, carried out Shia mosque bombings in Quetta in 2003.
By 2004, local tribal militants in the Shakai Valley were growing under Al-Qaeda’s influence. The local tribal militant leader, Nek Mohammad, transformed the local jihadist movement into a global network. This prompted leaders of the Central Asian jihadist movement, such as Tahir Yuldashev (leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), to move into South Waziristan—introducing Central Asian militant tactics to local tribal militants. This alarmed not only Pakistan but also the US, as it could resurge and sustain a global jihadist network. The US began to pressure Pakistan, already under strain from the War on Terror, and reached an agreement with local tribal militants—the Shakai Valley Agreement of 2004—to lay down arms and expel Al-Qaeda and Uzbek militants. However, Nek Mohammad double-crossed the Pakistani military establishment by continuing to house Uzbeks and Al-Qaeda members and maintaining cross-border terror operations.
The Turnaround
Pakistan’s ISI developed a turnaround strategy in collaboration with the US, recognising that it had lost proxy control and influence. This led to strengthening the US-Pakistan counter-terrorism partnership, during which the CIA conducted its first drone strike in Pakistan, killing Nek Mohamad in 2004. Pakistan’s ISI continued providing intelligence on tribal militant leaders, and the US initiated drone strike operations that caused substantial damage to tribal militants and Al-Qaeda’s operational areas in Pakistan. By 2007, US focus steadily declined as Pakistan’s counter-terror efforts were no longer a US priority. However, in 2007, TTP was formed and began operating in Pakistan. Between 2008 and 2014, several comprehensive agreements were negotiated and signed between TTP and the Pakistan military, but all failed due to ideological and tactical differences.
After 2011, the US’s Operation Neptune Spear in Pakistan to kill Osama Bin Laden significantly harmed the US-Pakistan counterterrorism partnership and operational trust, which caused Pakistan to become less prominent in US intelligence and cross-border operations in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
But the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 rekindled US-Pakistan cooperation, with the first notable example being Pakistan’s assistance to the US in a drone strike that eliminated Al-Qaeda’s leader, Al-Zawahiri, in Afghanistan. The transfer and arrest of ISIS-K terrorist Mohammad Sharifullah, responsible for the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan, further shifted US counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan. Moving into 2025, Pakistan faces threats from two fronts: the Taliban and TTP. Air strikes in Kabul, when the Taliban’s foreign minister was in Delhi, perhaps marked the first sign that Pakistan was demonstrating its ability to counter the Taliban, as it had decades earlier against Al-Qaeda. Pakistan’s continued air strikes and ground operations in Afghanistan may have been deliberate efforts to rebuild the US-Pakistan cooperation that existed from 2004 to 2007. For the US, weakening the Taliban to increase operational influence in Afghanistan might be beneficial; the obsession with Bagram Air Base during Trump’s presidency is one example.
India’s Strategy
India has a valuable opportunity to learn from its past mistake of adopting a safe strategy of restraint and minimal functional cooperation that offered more tactical than strategic gain. Moving beyond such minimal cooperation will help India build its strategic depth against Pakistan, not just tactically but also strategically, by boosting its Look West and Central Asian connectivity policies. This approach will also strengthen counter-terror operations in the Af-Pak region. The recent decision to upgrade the technical mission in India’s Embassy in Kabul reflects a step toward moving beyond a minimal functional relationship with the Taliban. Besides diplomatic and political benefits, India could revise its double-squeeze strategy, which aims to distract Pakistan and keep its machinery engaged along both eastern and western borders, ultimately weakening Pakistan economically and militarily and, most importantly, creating costs for US engagement with Pakistan—creating a triple gamble and tension for Pakistan. This must be one of the core strategies of India’s strategic depth in Afghanistan.
